diff --git a/src/server/middleware/trustedAuth.ts b/src/server/middleware/trustedAuth.ts
index 90e8b4c2..4bbf4910 100644
--- a/src/server/middleware/trustedAuth.ts
+++ b/src/server/middleware/trustedAuth.ts
@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
+import { timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';
+
 /*
  * Trusted-header SSO (Culpur Defense fork).
  *
- * Runs before route handlers. When TRUSTED_PROXY_ENABLED is set AND the request's
- * real socket peer is in TRUSTED_PROXY_IPS, this reads the identity header that a
+ * Runs before route handlers. When TRUSTED_PROXY_ENABLED is set and the request
+ * proves it came from the trusted proxy, this reads the identity header that a
  * trusted upstream (an Authentik forward-auth outpost) has asserted, resolves or
  * auto-provisions the matching wg-easy user, and establishes the normal wg-easy
  * session. Everything downstream (getCurrentUser -> definePermissionEventHandler
@@ -10,36 +12,69 @@
  *
  * SECURITY MODEL — why this is not an auth bypass:
  *   1. Off by default. Stock wg-easy never runs this branch.
- *   2. Source-IP allowlist. The identity header is honoured ONLY when the request
- *      arrives from the trusted proxy. We read the real connection peer via
- *      getRequestIP(event, { xForwardedFor: false }) — NOT X-Forwarded-For, which
- *      a client could spoof. In our topology the outpost also strips any
- *      client-supplied X-authentik-* headers and sets its own, so the header cannot
- *      arrive pre-set from a browser.
+ *   2. Shared secret (PRIMARY). The proxy injects TRUSTED_PROXY_SECRET_HEADER with
+ *      a secret only it knows; wg-easy verifies it with a constant-time compare. A
+ *      direct-to-port attacker on the LAN cannot forge it. THIS is the real trust
+ *      boundary in a shared-bridge topology, where Docker SNATs every inbound
+ *      connection to the docker0 gateway so the source IP alone can't tell the
+ *      proxy apart from any other host that can reach the published port.
+ *   3. Source-IP allowlist (OPTIONAL defense-in-depth). If TRUSTED_PROXY_IPS is
+ *      set, the real socket peer must also match. Read via getRequestIP(event,
+ *      { xForwardedFor: false }) — the connection remoteAddress, NOT the spoofable
+ *      X-Forwarded-For. Left empty when SNAT makes the peer non-discriminating.
+ *
+ * In our topology the outpost also strips any client-supplied X-authentik-* headers
+ * and sets its own, so the identity header cannot arrive pre-set from a browser.
  *
- * If the feature is disabled, the source is not allowlisted, or no header is
- * present, this middleware does nothing and the request falls through to the
- * existing password/session auth untouched.
+ * If the feature is disabled, the secret is missing/wrong, the (optional) IP check
+ * fails, or no identity header is present, this middleware does nothing and the
+ * request falls through to the existing password/session auth untouched.
  */
+
+/** Constant-time string compare that never throws on length/'' mismatch. */
+function secretMatches(provided: string | undefined, expected: string): boolean {
+  if (!provided) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  const a = Buffer.from(provided);
+  const b = Buffer.from(expected);
+  if (a.length !== b.length) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return timingSafeEqual(a, b);
+}
+
 export default defineEventHandler(async (event) => {
   if (!WG_ENV.TRUSTED_PROXY_ENABLED) {
     return;
   }
 
+  // Fail closed: enabling the feature without a secret must NOT trust anything.
+  if (!WG_ENV.TRUSTED_PROXY_SECRET) {
+    return;
+  }
+
   // Only act on API calls and page loads; leave setup/i18n alone (mirrors setup.ts).
   const url = getRequestURL(event);
   if (url.pathname.startsWith('/_i18n/') || url.pathname.startsWith('/setup/')) {
     return;
   }
 
-  // 1. Trust gate — the real socket peer must be an allowlisted proxy.
-  //    xForwardedFor:false makes h3 return the connection remoteAddress, so a
-  //    spoofed X-Forwarded-For cannot satisfy this check.
-  const peer = getRequestIP(event, { xForwardedFor: false });
-  if (!peer || !WG_ENV.TRUSTED_PROXY_IPS.includes(peer)) {
+  // 1a. Trust gate — the proxy-injected shared secret must match (constant time).
+  const providedSecret = getHeader(event, WG_ENV.TRUSTED_PROXY_SECRET_HEADER);
+  if (!secretMatches(providedSecret, WG_ENV.TRUSTED_PROXY_SECRET)) {
     return;
   }
 
+  // 1b. Optional defense-in-depth — if an IP allowlist is configured, the real
+  //     socket peer must also be in it. Skipped when the list is empty (SNAT case).
+  if (WG_ENV.TRUSTED_PROXY_IPS.length > 0) {
+    const peer = getRequestIP(event, { xForwardedFor: false });
+    if (!peer || !WG_ENV.TRUSTED_PROXY_IPS.includes(peer)) {
+      return;
+    }
+  }
+
   // 2. Read the identity the upstream verified.
   const username = getHeader(event, WG_ENV.TRUSTED_PROXY_HEADER)?.trim();
   if (!username) {
@@ -76,6 +111,6 @@ export default defineEventHandler(async (event) => {
   await session.update({ userId: user.id });
 
   SERVER_DEBUG(
-    `Trusted-header SSO: session established for ${user.id} (${user.username}) from ${peer}`
+    `Trusted-header SSO: session established for ${user.id} (${user.username})`
   );
 });
diff --git a/src/server/utils/config.ts b/src/server/utils/config.ts
index 8f2a4b34..4e00c5e7 100644
--- a/src/server/utils/config.ts
+++ b/src/server/utils/config.ts
@@ -51,6 +51,16 @@ export const WG_ENV = {
    * allowlist this would be an auth bypass. Leave both unset to keep the feature off.
    */
   TRUSTED_PROXY_ENABLED: process.env.TRUSTED_PROXY_ENABLED === 'true',
+  /**
+   * Shared secret the trusted proxy injects (PRIMARY trust factor). The feature
+   * fails closed if this is unset while enabled. In a shared-bridge / SNAT topology
+   * this — not the source IP — is what proves a request came from the proxy.
+   */
+  TRUSTED_PROXY_SECRET: process.env.TRUSTED_PROXY_SECRET ?? '',
+  /** Header the proxy uses to carry the shared secret. */
+  TRUSTED_PROXY_SECRET_HEADER: (
+    process.env.TRUSTED_PROXY_SECRET_HEADER ?? 'x-wg-proxy-secret'
+  ).toLowerCase(),
   /** Header carrying the verified username, e.g. 'x-authentik-username'. */
   TRUSTED_PROXY_HEADER: (
     process.env.TRUSTED_PROXY_HEADER ?? 'x-authentik-username'