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Merge branch 'master' into master

pull/2093/head
vemneyy 4 months ago
committed by GitHub
parent
729a1301e8 f0b0d89f02
commit
36e2796ef4
No known key found for this signature in database GPG Key ID: B5690EEEBB952194
11 changed files with 107 additions and 76 deletions
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  1. 2
      nfq/crypto/aes-gcm.c
  2. 27
      nfq/crypto/gcm.c
  3. 32
      nfq/crypto/hkdf.c
  4. 35
      nfq/crypto/hmac.c
  5. 12
      nfq/crypto/sha224-256.c
  6. 1
      nfq/darkmagic.c
  7. 5
      nfq/nfqws.c
  8. 3
      nfq/params.h
  9. 32
      nfq/protocol.c
  10. 18
      nfq/sec.h
  11. 16
      tpws/sec.h

2
nfq/crypto/aes-gcm.c
View File

@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ int aes_gcm_crypt(int mode, uint8_t *output, const uint8_t *input, size_t input_
int ret = 0;
gcm_context ctx;
gcm_initialize();
if (!(ret = gcm_setkey(&ctx, key, (const uint)key_len)))
{
ret = gcm_crypt_and_tag(&ctx, mode, iv, iv_len, adata, adata_len, input, output, input_length, atag, atag_len);

27
nfq/crypto/gcm.c
View File

@ -391,7 +391,9 @@ int gcm_finish(gcm_context *ctx, // pointer to user-provided GCM context
uint64_t orig_add_len = ctx->add_len * 8;
size_t i;
if (tag_len != 0) memcpy(tag, ctx->base_ectr, tag_len);
if (tag_len>16) return -1;
if (tag_len) memcpy(tag, ctx->base_ectr, tag_len);
if (orig_len || orig_add_len) {
memset(work_buf, 0x00, 16);
@ -443,10 +445,12 @@ int gcm_crypt_and_tag(
prepare the gcm context with the keying material, we simply
invoke each of the three GCM sub-functions in turn...
*/
gcm_start(ctx, mode, iv, iv_len, add, add_len);
gcm_update(ctx, length, input, output);
gcm_finish(ctx, tag, tag_len);
return(0);
if (tag_len>16) return -1;
int ret;
if ((ret=gcm_start(ctx, mode, iv, iv_len, add, add_len))) return ret;
if ((ret=gcm_update(ctx, length, input, output))) return ret;
return gcm_finish(ctx, tag, tag_len);
}
@ -477,23 +481,28 @@ int gcm_auth_decrypt(
uchar check_tag[16]; // the tag generated and returned by decryption
int diff; // an ORed flag to detect authentication errors
size_t i; // our local iterator
int ret;
if (tag_len>16) return -1;
/*
we use GCM_DECRYPT_AND_TAG (above) to perform our decryption
(which is an identical XORing to reverse the previous one)
and also to re-generate the matching authentication tag
*/
gcm_crypt_and_tag(ctx, AES_DECRYPT, iv, iv_len, add, add_len,
input, output, length, check_tag, tag_len);
if ((ret = gcm_crypt_and_tag(ctx, AES_DECRYPT, iv, iv_len, add, add_len, input, output, length, check_tag, tag_len))) return ret;
// now we verify the authentication tag in 'constant time'
for (diff = 0, i = 0; i < tag_len; i++)
diff |= tag[i] ^ check_tag[i];
if (diff != 0) { // see whether any bits differed?
if (diff)
{
// see whether any bits differed?
memset(output, 0, length); // if so... wipe the output data
return(GCM_AUTH_FAILURE); // return GCM_AUTH_FAILURE
}
return(0);
return 0;
}
/******************************************************************************

32
nfq/crypto/hkdf.c
View File

@ -60,9 +60,9 @@ int hkdf(SHAversion whichSha,
uint8_t okm[], size_t okm_len)
{
uint8_t prk[USHAMaxHashSize];
return hkdfExtract(whichSha, salt, salt_len, ikm, ikm_len, prk) ||
hkdfExpand(whichSha, prk, USHAHashSize(whichSha), info,
info_len, okm, okm_len);
int ret;
if ((ret=hkdfExtract(whichSha, salt, salt_len, ikm, ikm_len, prk))) return ret;
return hkdfExpand(whichSha, prk, USHAHashSize(whichSha), info, info_len, okm, okm_len);
}
/*
@ -103,9 +103,6 @@ int hkdfExtract(SHAversion whichSha,
salt_len = USHAHashSize(whichSha);
memset(nullSalt, '\0', salt_len);
}
else if (salt_len < 0) {
return shaBadParam;
}
return hmac(whichSha, ikm, ikm_len, salt, salt_len, prk);
}
@ -149,16 +146,13 @@ int hkdfExpand(SHAversion whichSha, const uint8_t prk[], size_t prk_len,
size_t hash_len, N;
unsigned char T[USHAMaxHashSize];
size_t Tlen, where, i;
int ret;
if (info == 0) {
info = (const unsigned char *)"";
info_len = 0;
}
else if (info_len < 0) {
return shaBadParam;
}
if (okm_len <= 0) return shaBadParam;
if (!okm) return shaBadParam;
if (!okm || !okm_len) return shaBadParam;
hash_len = USHAHashSize(whichSha);
if (prk_len < hash_len) return shaBadParam;
@ -171,12 +165,11 @@ int hkdfExpand(SHAversion whichSha, const uint8_t prk[], size_t prk_len,
for (i = 1; i <= N; i++) {
HMACContext context;
unsigned char c = i;
int ret = hmacReset(&context, whichSha, prk, prk_len) ||
hmacInput(&context, T, Tlen) ||
hmacInput(&context, info, info_len) ||
hmacInput(&context, &c, 1) ||
hmacResult(&context, T);
if (ret != shaSuccess) return ret;
if ((ret=hmacReset(&context, whichSha, prk, prk_len))) return ret;
if ((ret=hmacInput(&context, T, Tlen))) return ret;
if ((ret=hmacInput(&context, info, info_len))) return ret;
if ((ret=hmacInput(&context, &c, 1))) return ret;
if ((ret=hmacResult(&context, T))) return ret;
memcpy(okm + where, T,
(i != N) ? hash_len : (okm_len - where));
where += hash_len;
@ -328,9 +321,8 @@ int hkdfResult(HKDFContext *context,
if (!okm) return context->Corrupted = shaBadParam;
if (!prk) prk = prkbuf;
ret = hmacResult(&context->hmacContext, prk) ||
hkdfExpand(context->whichSha, prk, context->hashSize, info,
info_len, okm, okm_len);
if (!(ret = hmacResult(&context->hmacContext, prk)))
ret = hkdfExpand(context->whichSha, prk, context->hashSize, info, info_len, okm, okm_len);
context->Computed = 1;
return context->Corrupted = ret;
}

35
nfq/crypto/hmac.c
View File

@ -49,9 +49,10 @@ int hmac(SHAversion whichSha,
uint8_t digest[USHAMaxHashSize])
{
HMACContext context;
return hmacReset(&context, whichSha, key, key_len) ||
hmacInput(&context, message_array, length) ||
hmacResult(&context, digest);
int ret;
if ((ret=hmacReset(&context, whichSha, key, key_len))) return ret;
if ((ret=hmacInput(&context, message_array, length))) return ret;
return hmacResult(&context, digest);
}
/*
@ -101,10 +102,8 @@ int hmacReset(HMACContext *context, enum SHAversion whichSha,
*/
if (key_len > blocksize) {
USHAContext tcontext;
int err = USHAReset(&tcontext, whichSha) ||
USHAInput(&tcontext, key, key_len) ||
USHAResult(&tcontext, tempkey);
if (err != shaSuccess) return err;
if ((ret=USHAReset(&tcontext, whichSha)) || (ret=USHAInput(&tcontext, key, key_len)) || (ret=USHAResult(&tcontext, tempkey)))
return ret;
key = tempkey;
key_len = hashsize;
@ -134,9 +133,9 @@ int hmacReset(HMACContext *context, enum SHAversion whichSha,
/* perform inner hash */
/* init context for 1st pass */
ret = USHAReset(&context->shaContext, whichSha) ||
if (!(ret = USHAReset(&context->shaContext, whichSha)))
/* and start with inner pad */
USHAInput(&context->shaContext, k_ipad, blocksize);
ret = USHAInput(&context->shaContext, k_ipad, blocksize);
return context->Corrupted = ret;
}
@ -197,8 +196,7 @@ int hmacFinalBits(HMACContext *context,
if (context->Corrupted) return context->Corrupted;
if (context->Computed) return context->Corrupted = shaStateError;
/* then final bits of datagram */
return context->Corrupted =
USHAFinalBits(&context->shaContext, bits, bit_count);
return context->Corrupted = USHAFinalBits(&context->shaContext, bits, bit_count);
}
/*
@ -229,21 +227,16 @@ int hmacResult(HMACContext *context, uint8_t *digest)
/* finish up 1st pass */
/* (Use digest here as a temporary buffer.) */
ret =
USHAResult(&context->shaContext, digest) ||
if (!(ret=USHAResult(&context->shaContext, digest)) &&
/* perform outer SHA */
/* init context for 2nd pass */
USHAReset(&context->shaContext, context->whichSha) ||
!(ret=USHAReset(&context->shaContext, context->whichSha)) &&
/* start with outer pad */
USHAInput(&context->shaContext, context->k_opad,
context->blockSize) ||
!(ret=USHAInput(&context->shaContext, context->k_opad, context->blockSize)) &&
/* then results of 1st hash */
USHAInput(&context->shaContext, digest, context->hashSize) ||
!(ret=USHAInput(&context->shaContext, digest, context->hashSize)))
/* finish up 2nd pass */
USHAResult(&context->shaContext, digest);
ret=USHAResult(&context->shaContext, digest);
context->Computed = 1;
return context->Corrupted = ret;

12
nfq/crypto/sha224-256.c
View File

@ -64,12 +64,12 @@
* Add "length" to the length.
* Set Corrupted when overflow has occurred.
*/
static uint32_t addTemp;
#define SHA224_256AddLength(context, length) \
(addTemp = (context)->Length_Low, (context)->Corrupted = \
(((context)->Length_Low += (length)) < addTemp) && \
(++(context)->Length_High == 0) ? shaInputTooLong : \
(context)->Corrupted )
static int SHA224_256AddLength(SHA256Context *context, uint32_t length)
{
uint32_t addTemp = context->Length_Low;
if (((context->Length_Low += length) < addTemp) && (++(context)->Length_High == 0)) context->Corrupted = shaInputTooLong;
return context->Corrupted;
}
/* Local Function Prototypes */
static int SHA224_256Reset(SHA256Context *context, uint32_t *H0);

1
nfq/darkmagic.c
View File

@ -2096,6 +2096,7 @@ static bool scan_info(struct mnl_socket* nl, uint16_t wlan_family_id, struct wla
// wlan_info does not return ssid since kernel 5.19
// it's used to enumerate all wifi interfaces then call scan_info on each
if (!wlan_info(nl, wlan_family_id, &wc_all, false)) return false;
w->count=0;
for(int i=0;i<wc_all.count;i++)
if (!netlink_genl_simple_transact(nl, wlan_family_id, NLM_F_REQUEST | NLM_F_ACK | NLM_F_DUMP, NL80211_CMD_GET_SCAN, 0, scan_prepare, (void*)&wc_all.wlan[i].ifindex, scan_info_cb, w))
return false;

5
nfq/nfqws.c
View File

@ -377,6 +377,8 @@ static bool nfq_init(struct nfq_handle **h, struct nfq_q_handle **qh)
// dot not fail. not supported on old linuxes <3.6
}
nfnl_rcvbufsiz(nfq_nfnlh(*h), Q_RCVBUF);
DLOG_CONDUP("initializing raw sockets bind-fix4=%u bind-fix6=%u\n", params.bind_fix4, params.bind_fix6);
if (!rawsend_preinit(params.bind_fix4, params.bind_fix6))
goto exiterr;
@ -471,7 +473,7 @@ static int nfq_main(void)
if (rd)
{
int r = nfq_handle_packet(h, (char *)buf, (int)rd);
if (r) DLOG_ERR("nfq_handle_packet error %d\n", r);
if (r<0) DLOG_ERR("nfq_handle_packet result %d, errno %d : %s\n", r, errno, strerror(errno));
}
else
DLOG("recv from nfq returned 0 !\n");
@ -2517,6 +2519,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
#endif
srandom(time(NULL));
aes_init_keygen_tables(); // required for aes
PRINT_VER;

3
nfq/params.h
View File

@ -23,7 +23,8 @@
#define RAW_SNDBUF (64*1024) // in bytes
#define Q_MAXLEN 1024 // in packets
#define Q_MAXLEN 4986 // in packets
#define Q_RCVBUF (1024*1024) // in bytes
#define BADSEQ_INCREMENT_DEFAULT -10000
#define BADSEQ_ACK_INCREMENT_DEFAULT -66000

32
nfq/protocol.c
View File

@ -795,21 +795,19 @@ bool QUICDecryptInitial(const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len, uint8_t *clean, si
return false;
}
uint64_t payload_len,token_len;
size_t pn_offset;
uint64_t payload_len,token_len,pn_offset;
pn_offset = 1 + 4 + 1 + data[5];
if (pn_offset >= data_len) return false;
// SCID length
pn_offset += 1 + data[pn_offset];
if ((pn_offset + tvb_get_size(data[pn_offset])) >= data_len) return false;
if (pn_offset >= data_len || (pn_offset + tvb_get_size(data[pn_offset])) >= data_len) return false;
// token length
pn_offset += tvb_get_varint(data + pn_offset, &token_len);
pn_offset += token_len;
if (pn_offset >= data_len) return false;
if ((pn_offset + tvb_get_size(data[pn_offset])) >= data_len) return false;
if (pn_offset >= data_len || (pn_offset + tvb_get_size(data[pn_offset])) >= data_len) return false;
pn_offset += tvb_get_varint(data + pn_offset, &payload_len);
if (payload_len<20 || (pn_offset + payload_len)>data_len) return false;
aes_init_keygen_tables();
uint8_t sample_enc[16];
aes_context ctx;
if (aes_setkey(&ctx, 1, aeshp, sizeof(aeshp)) || aes_cipher(&ctx, data + pn_offset + 4, sample_enc)) return false;
@ -827,13 +825,13 @@ bool QUICDecryptInitial(const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len, uint8_t *clean, si
phton64(aesiv + sizeof(aesiv) - 8, pntoh64(aesiv + sizeof(aesiv) - 8) ^ pkn);
size_t cryptlen = payload_len - pkn_len - 16;
uint64_t cryptlen = payload_len - pkn_len - 16;
if (cryptlen > *clean_len) return false;
*clean_len = cryptlen;
*clean_len = (size_t)cryptlen;
const uint8_t *decrypt_begin = data + pn_offset + pkn_len;
uint8_t atag[16],header[256];
size_t header_len = pn_offset + pkn_len;
uint8_t atag[16],header[2048];
uint64_t header_len = pn_offset + pkn_len;
if (header_len > sizeof(header)) return false; // not likely header will be so large
memcpy(header, data, header_len);
header[0] = packet0;
@ -964,14 +962,12 @@ bool IsQUICInitial(const uint8_t *data, size_t len)
{
// too small packets are not likely to be initials
// long header, fixed bit
if (len < 128 || (data[0] & 0xF0)!=0xC0) return false;
if (len < 128) return false;
uint32_t ver = QUICExtractVersion(data,len);
if (QUICDraftVersion(ver) < 11) return false;
// quic v1 : initial packets are 00b
// quic v2 : initial packets are 01b
if ((data[0] & 0x30) != (is_quic_v2(ver) ? 0x10 : 0x00)) return false;
if ((data[0] & 0xF0) != (is_quic_v2(ver) ? 0xD0 : 0xC0)) return false;
uint64_t offset=5, sz, sz2;
@ -1021,7 +1017,7 @@ bool IsStunMessage(const uint8_t *data, size_t len)
{
return len>=20 && // header size
(data[0]&0xC0)==0 && // 2 most significant bits must be zeroes
(data[3]&0b11)==0 && // length must be a multiple of 4
ntohl(*(uint32_t*)(&data[4]))==0x2112A442 && // magic cookie
ntohs(*(uint16_t*)(&data[2]))==len-20;
(data[3]&3)==0 && // length must be a multiple of 4
pntoh32(data+4)==0x2112A442 && // magic cookie
pntoh16(data+2)<=(len-20);
}

18
nfq/sec.h
View File

@ -18,12 +18,26 @@ bool dropcaps(void);
#define arch_nr (offsetof(struct seccomp_data, arch))
#define syscall_arg(x) (offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[x]))
#ifndef __AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT
#define __AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT 0x80000000
#endif
#ifndef __AUDIT_ARCH_LE
#define __AUDIT_ARCH_LE 0x40000000
#endif
#ifndef EM_RISCV
#define EM_RISCV 243
#endif
#ifndef AUDIT_ARCH_RISCV64
#define AUDIT_ARCH_RISCV64 (EM_RISCV | __AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT | __AUDIT_ARCH_LE)
#endif
#ifndef EM_LOONGARCH
#define EM_LOONGARCH 258
#endif
#ifndef AUDIT_ARCH_LOONGARCH64
#define AUDIT_ARCH_LOONGARCH64 (EM_LOONGARCH | __AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT | __AUDIT_ARCH_LE)
#endif
#if defined(__aarch64__)
@ -79,6 +93,10 @@ bool dropcaps(void);
# define ARCH_NR AUDIT_ARCH_RISCV64
#elif defined(__loongarch__) && __loongarch_grlen == 64
# define ARCH_NR AUDIT_ARCH_LOONGARCH64
#else
# error "Platform does not support seccomp filter yet"

16
tpws/sec.h
View File

@ -20,6 +20,12 @@ bool dropcaps(void);
#define arch_nr (offsetof(struct seccomp_data, arch))
#define syscall_arg(x) (offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[x]))
#ifndef __AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT
#define __AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT 0x80000000
#endif
#ifndef __AUDIT_ARCH_LE
#define __AUDIT_ARCH_LE 0x40000000
#endif
#ifndef EM_RISCV
#define EM_RISCV 243
#endif
@ -27,6 +33,12 @@ bool dropcaps(void);
#define AUDIT_ARCH_RISCV64 (EM_RISCV | __AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT | __AUDIT_ARCH_LE)
#endif
#ifndef EM_LOONGARCH
#define EM_LOONGARCH 258
#endif
#ifndef AUDIT_ARCH_LOONGARCH64
#define AUDIT_ARCH_LOONGARCH64 (EM_LOONGARCH | __AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT | __AUDIT_ARCH_LE)
#endif
#if defined(__aarch64__)
# define ARCH_NR AUDIT_ARCH_AARCH64
@ -81,6 +93,10 @@ bool dropcaps(void);
# define ARCH_NR AUDIT_ARCH_RISCV64
#elif defined(__loongarch__) && __loongarch_grlen == 64
# define ARCH_NR AUDIT_ARCH_LOONGARCH64
#else
# error "Platform does not support seccomp filter yet"

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